Opacity Enforcing Control Synthesis by Dubreil, Jérémy et al.
HAL Id: inria-00344269
https://hal.inria.fr/inria-00344269
Submitted on 4 Dec 2008
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non,
émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de
recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires
publics ou privés.
Opacity Enforcing Control Synthesis
Jérémy Dubreil, Philippe Darondeau, Hervé Marchand
To cite this version:
Jérémy Dubreil, Philippe Darondeau, Hervé Marchand. Opacity Enforcing Control Synthesis. Work-
shop on Discrete Event Systems, WODES’08, May 2008, Goteborg, Sweden. pp.28-35. ￿inria-
00344269￿
Opacity Enforcing Control Synthesis
Jéŕemy Dubreil, Philippe Darondeau and Herv´ Marchand
INRIA Rennes - Bretagne Atlantique, Rennes, France
e-mail : {First.Last}@irisa.fr
Abstract— Given a finite transition system and a regular
predicate, we address the problem of computing a controller
enforcing the opacity of the predicate against an attacker (that
partially observes the system), supposedly trying to push the
system to reveal the predicate. Assuming that the controller can
only control a subset of the events it observes (possibly different
from the ones of the attacker), we show that an optimal control
always exists and provide sufficient conditions under which it
is regular and effectively computable. These conditions rely on
the inclusion relationships between the observable alphabets of
the attacker and the controller and the controllable alphabet.
Index Terms— control, security, opacity, discrete event sys-
tems, partial observation
I. I NTRODUCTION
Opacity, whose goal is to oppose diagnosis, was intro-
duced in [1] and [2]. Given a system, equipped with a
map sending (prefixes of) executions to observations, an
opaque predicate is a set of executions such that every
execution in the set is observationally equivalent to some
execution outside the set. So, membership to an opaque
predicate is never disclosed by observation. Anonymity and
non-interference may be reduced to the opacity of suitable
predicates for suitable observation maps [2]. In this paper,
we concentrate on finite transition systems labelled over
an alphabetΣ, on predicates defined by regular sets of
execution traces inΣ∗, and on observation maps induced by
the projection of execution traces on a sub-alphabetΣa of Σ,
modeling the attacker’s alphabet. Under these assumptions,
opacity can be decided although it cannot be expressed in
the modalµ-calculus [3].
We are specially interested in cases when the predicate
of interest isnon-opaque, i.e. the system leaks confidential
information. A possible arrangement is then to augment
the system with a monitor, responsible for detecting when
confidential information was leaked or will be leaked unless
one halts the system immediately. Assuming that monitors
observe only a subsetΣm of the events of the system,
which needs not be a subset ofΣa, necessary and sufficient
conditions for the existence of monitors were obtained in [4].
We want to take one step further by providing a controller
that does enforce the opacity of the predicate by disabling at
each stage (of an execution) the least subset of events such
that confidential information is not leaked sooner or later.
Assuming that controllers observe all events and all events
can be controlled, sufficient conditions for the existence of
finite state controllers were proposed in [5] (the opacity of
This work is partially supported by the RNRT Politess project.
several predicates is enforced there on concurrent attackers).
We consider here one predicate and one attacker, but we
relax the assumptions on controllable and observable events.
Namely, ifΣ is the set of events of the system, letΣa ⊆ Σ be
the attacker’s alphabet, and letΣc andΣm be the subsets of
events controlled or observed by the controller, respectivly,
then we assume thatΣc ⊆ Σm andΣa compares both with
Σc andΣm.
Let L(G) ⊆ Σ∗ be the regular language of the system
G and letLϕ ⊆ Σ∗ be the regular but non-opaque predicate
whose opacity should be enforced by control. Not taking into
account controllability and observability, there is a largest
subsetL1 of L(G) such thatLϕ is opaque w.r.t.L1 and
Σa, and L1 is regular [5]. As Σc ⊆ Σm, there exists
a most permissive controllerK1 confining the system to
L1 and K1 is regular. Unfortunately, this controllerdoes
not always enforce the opacity ofLϕ (unlessΣa ⊆ Σc
or Σm ⊆ Σa as we shall explain later on). The reason
why it fails to do so is that a complete description of the
closed-loop system may be available to the attacker and new
confidential information on the execution may be inferred
from this knowledge. To solve the problem, one might think
of iterating the construction, thus producing a decreasing
chain of regular languagesL(G) = K0 ⊇ K1 ⊇ K2 ⊇ . . ..
Unfortunately, the iteration may be infinite, hence it may not
yield an effective construction of∩iKi and it does not show
either that this limit is regular.
Our contribution is twofold. For the casesΣa ⊆ Σc
and Σm ⊆ Σa, we show that the optimal opacity control
can be computed within the framework of Ramadge and
Wonham’s theory. For the remaining caseΣc ⊆ Σa ⊆
Σm
1, for which the iteration may be infinite, we supply an
alternative algorithm that computes the limit of the infinite
iteration described above. The algorithm works in double
exponential time. We do not investigate optimizations nor
heuristics in this paper for our primary goal is to show that
the construction of the optimal opacity control is effective.
This work has loose relationship with the earlier work
done by Schneider on security automata [6], subsequently
extended to edit automata [7]. The goal pursued in [6] was
to produce interface automata that enforcesecurity policies
Lϕ , meaning that the interface automaton rejects those inputs
from the environment that would lead the system to leave the
subset of safe execution prefixesLϕ. In our case, the role of
the controller is not to confine the executions of the system
1Remember thatΣa is assumed to compare with bothΣc andΣm.
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to Lϕ but to the largest opaque subset ofL(G) w.r.t. Lϕ and
Σa. On the other hand, wheneverΣc ⊆ Σa, our controllers
may be seen as interface automata, as they reject events from
the attacker’s alphabet exclusively.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
fixes some notation. Section 3 brings back the basics of
opacity properties and it sets the opacity control problem.
Section 4 brings back the theory of Supervisory Control.
Section 5, which is the core of the paper, contains our
contribution. Optimal opacity control is obtained whenever
Σc ⊆ Σm and Σa compares with both of them. Moreover,
we produce an example showing that the problem cannot be
solved in the framework of Ramadge and Wonham’s theory
when Σc ⊆ Σa ⊆ Σm. Section 6 is a brief conclusion
pointing to open problems.
II. N OTATIONS
Let Σ be a finite alphabet of events. Astring is a finite
sequence of events. The set of all strings is denoted byΣ∗.
Any subset ofΣ∗ is called alanguageover Σ. Let L be
a language overΣ. The prefix-closureof L is defined as
L = {s ∈ Σ∗ | ∃t ∈ Σ∗ s.t. st ∈ L}. We assume that
systems are Labelled Transitions Systems (LTS) as follows.
Definition 1 (LTS): An LTS overΣ is a 4-tuple G =
(QG,Σ, δG, q
G
0) where QG is a finite set of states,Σ is the
finite set ofeventsof G, qG0 ∈ QG is the initial state, and
δG : QG × Σ → QG is a partial transition function. ⋄
In the sequel, we writeq
a
→G q
′ if δ(q, a) = q′ and q
a
→G
if ∃q′ ∈ QG, q
a
→G q
′. We extend→G to arbitrary sequences
by settingq
ε
→G q for all statesq, and q
sσ
→G q
′ whenever
q
s
→G q
′′ and q′′
σ
→G q
′, for someq′′ ∈ QG, s ∈ Σ∗ and
σ ∈ Σ. We denote
TG = {(q, σ, q
′) ∈ Q × Σ × Q : q
σ
→ q′}
the set of transitions ofG andL(G) = {l ∈ Σ∗ | qG0
l
→G} the
set of its execution traces. Given non-empty subsetsIG, FG ⊆
QG, the definitions extend toLFG(G) = {s ∈ Σ
∗ | ∃q ∈
FG, q
G
0
s
→G q} (the set of execution traces ending in a final
state ofFG) and LIG,FG(G) = {s ∈ Σ
∗ | ∃q′ ∈ IG, ∃q ∈
FG, q
′ s→G q} (the set of partial execution traces starting in
a state ofIG and ending in a state ofFG).
Opacity control aims at preventing an attackerA from de-
ducing confidential information on the execution of a system
from the observation of a subset of eventsΣa. To model
this, we use the classical notion ofprojection. We simply
denote byPΣa the projection fromΣ
∗ to Σ∗a that erases in a
sequence ofΣ∗ all events not inΣa. This definition extends
to (regular) languages:PΣa(K) = {µ ∈ Σ
∗
a | ∃s ∈ K, µ =
PΣa(s)}. Conversely, givenK ⊆ Σ
∗
a, the inverse projection
of K is P−1Σa (K) = {s ∈ Σ
∗ | PΣa(s) ∈ K}. Given an LTS
G over Σ and a set of observable eventsΣa ⊆ Σ, the set of
observed tracesof G is PΣa(L(G)). Given two sequences
s, s′ ∈ Σ∗, we let s ∼a s′ in casePΣa(s) = PΣa(s
′) and
denote[s]a = P
−1
Σa
(PΣa(s)) the equivalence class ofs.
Lemma 1: LetΣa ⊆ Σb ⊆ Σ, thens ∼b s′ ⇒ s ∼a s′.
III. T HE BASICS OF OPACITY
Consider an LTSG over Σ, a regular predicateLϕ ⊆ Σ∗,
and a sub-alphabetΣa ⊆ Σ. The alphabetΣa defines the
interface provided to the user for interacting withG. The
predicateLϕ represents a confidential information on the
execution ofG, i.e. if the current trace of execution iss ∈ Σ∗,
the user should not be able to deduce fromPΣa(s) and G
that s ∈ Lϕ. In this setting, the user is considered as an
attacker (A) willing to catch the confidential information
and armed for this with full information on the structure of
G but only partial information upon its behavior, namely
the observed trace inΣ∗a. In order that the confidential
information is never leaked, it is necessary and sufficient
that Lϕ is an opaque predicate according to the following
definition, adapted from [2].
Definition 2 (Opacity):Lϕ is said to be opaque w.r.t.
L(G) and Σa if
∀s ∈ L(G), [s]a ∩ L(G) 6⊆ Lϕ (1)
In other words,Lϕ is opaque w.r.t.L(G) and Σa if and
only if ∀µ ∈ PΣa(L(G)), P
−1
Σa
(µ) ∩ L(G) 6⊆ Lϕ, and
Lϕ is non-opaque w.r.t.L(G) and Σa if and only if ∃µ ∈
PΣa(L(G)), P
−1
Σa
(µ) ∩ L(G) ⊆ Lϕ.
Example 1: Consider the two specificationsG1 and G2
of a coffee-machine depicted in Figures 1 and 2, and let
Σa = {coinIn, coinOut, cancel, confirm, coffeeOut}.
Consider the predicateLϕ = Σ∗.full.Σ∗. Then,Lϕ is not
Fig. 1. The predicateLϕ is non opaque w.r.t.G1 andΣa
opaque with respect toL(G1) and Σa, since e.g. for the
observed tracecoinIn.coinOut for which the only possible
execution trace iscoinIn.isCashFull.full.coinOut ∈ Lϕ.
A contrario Lϕ is opaque with respect toL(G2) and Σa.
If Lϕ is not opaque w.r.t.L(G) and Σa, then it is still
possible to restrict the behavior ofG so thatLϕ becomes
opaque. This can be obtained by withdrawing fromL(G) all
wordsu.v such thatu ∼a u′ ⇒ u′ ∈ Lϕ for all u′ ∈ L(G).
Proposition 1 ([5]): Given a systemG and a predicate
Lϕ, there exists a supremal prefix-closed sub-language of
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Fig. 2. The predicateLϕ is opaque w.r.t.G2 andΣa
L(G), noted OP↑(L(G), Lϕ,Σa), such thatLϕ is opaque
w.r.t. OP↑(L(G), Lϕ,Σa) and Σa, and it is given by
OP↑(L(G), Lϕ,Σa) =
L(G) \ ((L(G) \ P−1Σa (PΣa(L(G) \ Lϕ))).Σ
∗)
(2)
Intuitively, the languageP−1Σa (PΣa(L(G) \ Lϕ)) is the set
of the “safe” sequences that do not revealLϕ2, whereas any
sequence inL(G)\P−1Σa (PΣa(L(G)\Lϕ)) revealsLϕ (these
sequences are extended withΣ∗ because, onceLϕ has been
revealed, this holds for ever).
It follows from proposition 1 that OP↑(L(G), Lϕ,Σa) is
the union of all prefix-closed sub-languagesL′ of L(G),
such that Lϕ is opaque w.r.t.L′ and Σa [5]. There-
fore, OP↑ is monotone in the first argument. Note that
OP↑(L(G), Lϕ,Σa) can be empty. In that case, there is no
way to enforce opacity by restricting the behavior of the
system.
Remark 1: IfLϕ is opaque w.r.t.L1 and L2, then it is
opaque w.r.t.L1 ∪ L2, but not necessarily w.r.t.L1 ∩ L2.
Similarly, if L1 ⊆ L ⊆ L2, Lϕ may be opaque w.r.t.L but
not opaque w.r.t.L1 or L2. ⋄
Next, we establish a helpful lemma, stating that if a se-
quences belongs to OP↑(L(G), Lϕ,Σa), then any sequence
in L(G) observationally equivalent tos also belongs to
OP↑(L(G), Lϕ,Σa).
Lemma 2:∀s ∈ OP↑(L(G), Lϕ,Σa),
[s]a ∩ L(G) ⊆ OP
↑(L(G), Lϕ,Σa)
Proof: Let s′ ∈ [s]a ∩ L(G), then by definition
s ∼a s
′ and s′ ∈ L(G). Suppose for a contradiction that
s′ /∈ OP↑(L(G), Lϕ,Σa), then s′ = uv for someu such
that u ∼a u′ ⇒ u′ ∈ Lϕ for all u′ ∈ L(G). As s ∼a s′,
s = u”v” for someu” ∈ L(G) such thatu ∼a u”. Therefore,
u” ∼a u
′ ⇒ u′ ∈ Lϕ for all u′ ∈ L(G), showing that
s /∈ OP↑(L(G), Lϕ,Σa), a contradiction.
Dually, this lemma implies that if a sequences belongs to
L(G)\OP↑(Lϕ, L(G),Σa), then no sequence observationally
2Note that this language is not prefix-closed.
equivalent tos belongs to OP↑(L(G), Lϕ,Σa). In other
words, when computing the supremal sub-language ofL(G)
with respect to whichLϕ is opaque, each equivalence class
of L(G) w.r.t. Σa is either entirely kept or removed.
Our goal is to enforce opacity by supervisory control,
which puts strong conditions on the admissible restrictions
of L(G) (due to the so-called controllability and observ-
ability conditions that a controller has to fulfill to be imple-
mentable). We will also compute the most permissive opacity
control in the form of a regular sub-language ofL(G). Next
section brings back a few notions of supervisory control
theory.
IV. T HE BASICS OFSUPERVISORYCONTROL
Given a prefix-closed behaviorK ⊆ L(G) ⊆ Σ∗ expected
from the systemG, the goal of supervisory control is to
enforce this behavior onG by pairing this system with a
monitor (also called controller) that observes a subsetΣm
of the events inΣ and controls a subsetΣc of the events in
Σ, i.e. enables or disables each instance of these controllable
events.Σ \ Σc is the set of uncontrollable events.Σ \ Σm
is the set of unobservable events. We now recall some basic
concepts of supervisory control theory. More information on
the computational aspects can be found in [8].
Definition 3: A prefix-closed languageK ⊆ L(G) is
controllable w.r.t.L(G) and Σc if K.(Σ \Σc)∩L(G) ⊆ K.
This definition states that ifK is controllable, then no
uncontrollable events need to be disabled to exactly confine
the systemL(G) to K. Note that the union of an arbitrary
number of controllable languages is controllable.
Definition 4: Assuming thatΣc ⊆ Σm, a prefix-
closed languageK is observable w.r.t.L(G) and Σm if
P−1Σm [PΣm(K)] ∩ L(G) ⊆ K
3.
Intuitively, K is observable, ifK can be exactly recovered
from its projectionPΣm(K) and L(G). Note that this is a
necessary condition for a controller that forces the system
to behave likeK to be implementable. In other words, from
a control point of view, when disabling an eventc after the
execution ofs, thenc has to be disabled after all execution
traces of[s]m. Under the assumptionΣc ⊆ Σm, the union of
an arbitrary number of observable languages is observable.
Therefore, under this assumption, both controllability and
observability are stable under union of languages, and there
exists a supremal controllable and observable prefix-closed
sub-language ofK, that we denote
CO↑(K,L(G),Σc,Σm) (3)
The language CO↑(K,L(G),Σc,Σm) represents the largest
behavior included inK(⊆ L(G)) that can be enforced by
control. Moreover, CO↑ is monotone in the first argument.
Lemma 3: Assuming thatΣc ⊆ Σm, let s ∈ K \
CO↑(K,L(G),Σc,Σm), then
[s]m ∩ CO
↑(K,L(G),Σc,Σm) = ∅
3Note that we have given here the formal definition of normality.Under
the assumptionΣc ⊆ Σm, observability and normality coincide [9].
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Proof: Because CO↑(K,L(G),Σc,Σm) is observable,
this set and its relative complement are unions of equivalence
classes of∼m.
Similarly to lemma 2, the equivalence classes ofL(G)
w.r.t. Σm are preserved by control.
V. ENFORCING OPACITY BY CONTROL
Our purpose is to solve the opacity control problem stated
as follows.
Problem: Show that the set of controllable and observable
restrictions (i.e. sub-languages) ofL(G) enforcing
the opacity ofLϕ either is empty or has a great-
est element and compute this maximal permissive
controllable and observable sub-language ofL(G).
In the sequel, we shall assume that an attacker has a
full knowledge of the structure ofG, knows the interface
of the controllerΣm and is able to perform in his head
all calculations that the administrator has made to compute
this controller. In particular, this entails that the strucure of
the controlled system may be available to the attacker, thus
possibly inducing new confidential information flow. This
assumptions are at present informal, but might be formalized
e.g. using language theory and epistemic logic. Moreover,in
the rest of the paper, it is always assumed thatΣc ⊆ Σm
(the controllable events are observed by the controller).
A. Characterization of the solution
We now investigate the existence of a supremal solution
to the opacity control problem. To do so, we consider the set
Cϕ = {L ⊆ L(G) | Lϕ is opaque w.r.t.L andΣa,
L is prefix-closed,
L is controllable w.r.t.L(G) andΣc,
L is observable w.r.t.L(G) andΣm}
and the prefix-closed language
CO-OP↑(L(G), Lϕ,Σa,Σm,Σc) =
⋃
L∈Cϕ
L (4)
Proposition 2: If CO-OP↑(L(G), Lϕ,Σa,Σm,Σc) 6= ∅,
then it is the supremal sub-language ofL(G) such that
(1) CO-OP↑(L(G), Lϕ,Σa,Σm,Σc) is controllable
and observable w.r.t.L(G), Σc and Σm,
(2) and Lϕ is opaque w.r.t.
CO-OP↑(L(G), Lϕ,Σa,Σm,Σc) and Σa.
Otherwise, no control can enforce the opacity ofLϕ.
Proof: If CO-OP↑(L(G), Lϕ,Σa,Σm,Σc) 6= ∅, then it
is the union of an arbitrary number of languages that are con-
trollable, observable and such thatLϕ is opaque w.r.t. the cor-
responding restrictions ofL(G). These three properties are
stable under arbitrary union of languages (under the hypoth-
esis thatΣc ⊆ Σm). So CO-OP
↑(L(G), Lϕ,Σa,Σm,Σc)
satisfies (1) and (2).
Even though the previous proposition entails the existence
of a unique maximal sub-language ofL(G), that is control-
lable, observable and in restriction to whichLϕ is opaque,
we still have to examine whether this language is regular (or
at least, to exhibit sufficient conditions for regularity) and to
provide an effective computation of this language.
It may be remarked that restricting languages to en-
sure controllability and observability does not always pre-
serve opacity and the other way round (See Example 2).
Thus, in a first attempt towards an effective computation
of CO-OP↑(L(G), Lϕ,Σa,Σm,Σc), following the classical
methodology of Supervisory Control Theory4, we establish
below a fix-point characterization of this language by alter-
nating the computation of the supremal sub-language that
ensures the opacity ofLϕ and the supremal controllable and
observable sub-language.
Consider the operator
K(•) = CO↑(OP↑(•, Lϕ,Σa), L(G),Σc,Σm).
Remark thatK(•) is monotone w.r.t. set inclusion. Now, as
the prefix-closed subsets ofL(G) form a complete sub-lattice
of P(Σ∗), it follows from Knaster-Tarski’s Theorem [10]
that K(•) has a greatest fix-point in this sub-lattice. Let
K(L(G), Lϕ) be the greatest fix-point of the operatorK(•)
included inL(G)5.
Proposition 3:
K(L(G), Lϕ) = CO-OP
↑(L(G), Lϕ,Σa,Σm,Σc)
Proof: We denote Lc =
CO-OP↑(L(G), Lϕ,Σa,Σm,Σc). Clearly, Lϕ is opaque
w.r.t. K(L(G), Lϕ) and Σa. This language is controllable
and observable, henceK(L(G), Lϕ) ⊆ Lc.
Moreover, we haveLc ⊆ L(G) = K0(L(G)). Assume
now that Lc ⊆ Ki(L(G)) for some i. Then, from the
monotony ofK(•), we getKi+1(L(G)) ⊇ K(Lc) = Lc,
since Lc controllable and observable andLϕ is opaque
w.r.t. Lc and Σa. By transfinite induction, it follows that
Lc ⊆ Kα(L(G)) for every ordinal α. ThereforeLc ⊆
∩αK
α(L(G)) = K(L(G), Lϕ).
Note that this fix-point characterization of
CO-OP↑(L(G), Lϕ,Σa,Σm,Σc) does not ensure that
this language can be always computed by a finite iteration
as the following example shows.
Example 2: Consider the LTSG shown in Fig. 3 where
Σa = {A,B, c}, Σm = Σ, Σc = {c} and the predicateLϕ
is the set of the sequences that reach the states represented
with squares inG. Let Ki = Ki(L(G)) denote the language
computed afteri iterations of the operatorK(•).
A
c c c
uu
B
A
cc B
∈ Lϕ
∈ Lϕ
c
Fig. 3. L(G) andLϕ
In L(G), the sole string that belongs toLϕ, and therefore
reveals it, isc.c.A, which requires to disable the second event
4that ensures both non-blocking and controllability
5K(L(G), Lϕ) is also the greatest fix-point of the operatorK′ =
OP↑(CO↑(•, L(G), Σc, Σm), Lϕ, Σa).
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c, seeing thatA is uncontrollable. The LTS that generatesK1
is represented in Fig. 4(a). InK1, c.c.A has disappeared and
(a)
(b)
c
c c c
uu
B
A
A
∈ Lϕ
∈ Lϕ
u
cc
u
c c c
uu
B
A
A
∈ Lϕ
∈ Lϕ
c
u
c
c
c
c B
c B
Fig. 4. K1 andK2
the sole string that belongs toLϕ, and therefore reveals it, is
c.u.c.c.B, which requires to disable the eventc after c.u.c.
The result (K2) is depicted in Fig. 4(b). After2i iterations of
the operatorK(•), one gets the languageK2i generated by
the LTS depicted in Fig. 5(a). InK2i, the string(c.u)2i.c.c.A
(a)
(b)
B
c c c
uu
B
A
A
∈ Lϕ
∈ Lϕ
(c.u)2i
c c c
uu
A
A
∈ Lϕ
∈ Lϕ
c c
c B
Bc
c c
(c.u)2i+1
Fig. 5. K2i andK2i+1
revealsLϕ and it must be eliminated by disabling the lastc,
which is done in the languageK2i+1 (See Fig. 5(b). But, in
K2i+1, the string(c.u)2i+1.c.c.B revealsLϕ. Disabling the
lastc leads toK2i+2, which reproduces the situation found in
K2i (up to replacing the prefix(c.u)2i by (c.u)2i+2. Finally,
even though the limitK(L(G), Lϕ) of this decreasing chain
is the regular language(c.u.c.u)∗, the fix-point iteration pro-
duces a strictly decreasing and infinite sequence of languages
Kj showing that the above algorithm may not terminate.⋄
In the rest of the paper, we investigate sufficient conditions,
induced by relations between the alphabetsΣc, Σa andΣm,
under which CO-OP↑(L(G), Lϕ,Σa,Σm,Σc) is regular and
one can effectively compute uniformly from the arguments
of CO-OP↑(•) a finite automaton generating this optimal
opacity control.
But first, we establish a proposition that helps to simplify
the remaining proofs (In Sections V-B.2 and V-B.3). This
proposition states that wheneverΣa ⊆ Σm ⊆ Σ, we can
reformulate the control problem in terms of the observed
system w.r.t.Σm and a new predicateLmϕ ⊆ Σ
∗
m derived
from Lϕ andΣm, solve the problem in this new setting (thus,
under full observation) and lift up the solution to the initial
setting. The intuition is that observing events fromΣ \ Σm
could not help the controller anyway.
Proposition 4: Assume thatΣa ⊆ Σm ⊆ Σ and Σc ⊆
Σm. Let Lϕ, L(G) ⊆ Σ∗, then
CO-OP↑(L(G), Lϕ,Σa,Σm,Σc) =
P−1Σm(CO-OP
↑(PΣm(L(G)), L
m
ϕ ,Σa,Σm,Σc)) ∩ L(G)
whereLmϕ = {ρ ∈ PΣm(L(G)) : P
−1
Σm
(ρ) ∩ L(G) ⊆ Lϕ}
Proof: Consider the following languages:
• K = CO-OP↑(L(G), Lϕ,Σa,Σm,Σc),
• F = CO-OP↑(PΣm(L(G)), L
m
ϕ ,Σa,Σm,Σc)
• H = P−1Σm(F ) ∩ L(G).
We will prove thatH = K.
Let us first prove thatLϕ is opaque w.r.t.H and Σa.
Considers ∈ H ∩ Lϕ. As PΣm(s) ∈ F and L
m
ϕ is opaque
w.r.t. F and Σa (by definition of F ), there existsρ ∈ F
such thatρ ∼a PΣm(s) and ρ ∈ F \ L
m
ϕ . Then, ∃s
′ ∈
P−1Σm(ρ) ∩ L(G), s
′ 6∈ Lϕ according to the definition ofLmϕ .
But ρ ∈ F implies thats′ ∈ H. PΣm(s
′) ∼a PΣm(s) and
Σa ⊆ Σm implies thats′ ∼a s. So Lϕ is opaque w.r.t.H
andΣa.
Let us now show thatH is controllable. Considers ∈
H,σ ∈ Σ \ Σc such thatsσ ∈ L(G). Let ρ = PΣm(s). By
definition of H, we getρ ∈ F .
• If σ 6∈ Σm thenPΣm(sσ) = ρ and finallysσ ∈ H.
• If σ ∈ Σm, we haveρ ∈ F andρσ ∈ PΣm(L(G)). As
F is controllable, we getρσ ∈ F , which entailssσ ∈ H
assσ ∈ P−1Σm({ρσ}).
Finally we note thatH is observable by construction. AsK
is the supremal controllable and observable sub-language of
L(G) for whichLϕ is opaque, we can conclude thatH ⊆ K.
Let us now prove thatPΣm(K) ⊆ F .
• Let ρ ∈ PΣm(K). There existss ∈ K such that
PΣm(s) = ρ. Since Lϕ is opaque w.r.t.K and Σa,
there existss′ ∈ K, s′ ∼a s such thats′ ∈ K \ Lϕ.
Let ρ′ = PΣm(s
′). We haveρ′ 6∈ Lmϕ . As ρ ∼a ρ
′, we
conclude thatLmϕ is opaque w.r.t.PΣm(K) andΣa.
• Let us show that PΣm(K) is controllable w.r.t.
PΣm(L(G)) andΣc. Let ρ ∈ PΣm(K) andσ ∈ Σm\Σc
such thatρσ ∈ PΣm(L(G)). Then,∃s ∈ K ⊆ L(G),
such thatPΣm(s) = ρ and sσ ∈ K(Σm \ Σc) ∩ L(G).
Since K is controllable, sσ ∈ K and thenρσ =
PΣm(sσ) ∈ PΣm(K). So PΣm(K) is controllable.
Now, PΣm(K) is obviously observable and we get that
PΣm(K) ⊆ F . This implies thatP
−1
Σm
(PΣm(K)) ∩ L(G) ⊆
H and sinceK = K ∩L(G) ⊆ P−1Σm(PΣm(K))∩L(G), we
conclude thatK ⊆ H and finally thatH = K.
B. Effective computation of the supremal solution
Next, we investigate three sufficient conditions under
which CO-OP↑(L(G), Lϕ,Σa,Σm,Σc) is regular and effec-
tively computable.These conditions bear upon the inclusion
relationships between the alphabetsΣa, Σm andΣc.
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1) Assumption 1:Σc ⊆ Σm ⊆ Σa ⊆ Σ: Under this
assumption, the controller observes and controls only a part
of the actions of the attacker, meaning that it is less powerful
than the attacker. Nevertheless, this is a sufficient condition
allowing to solve the control problem.
Proposition 5: AssumeΣc ⊆ Σm ⊆ Σa ⊆ Σ, then
K1 (= K(L(G))) = CO-OP
↑(L(G), Lϕ,Σa,Σm,Σc) is
regular and effectively computable.
Proof: Let L1 = OP
↑(L(G), Lϕ,Σa), then K1 =
CO↑(L1, L(G),Σc,Σm). Considers ∈ K1 ∩ Lϕ. As Lϕ is
opaque w.r.t.L1 andΣa, ∃s′ ∈ L1 such thats ∼a s′ ands′ /∈
Lϕ. As Σm ⊆ Σa ands ∼a s′, we gets ∼m s′. Hence, as an
immediate consequence of Lemma 3, we also haves′ ∈ K1,
which entails thatLϕ is opaque w.r.t.K1 and Σa. Hence,
K1 = K(L(G), Lϕ), which according to Proposition 3
entails thatK1 = CO-OP
↑(L(G), Lϕ,Σa,Σm,Σc).
2) Assumption 2:Σa ⊆ Σc ⊆ Σm ⊆ Σ: This assumption
simply means that the controller can observe all the actions
of the attacker and control them.
Based on proposition 4, one can assume, without loss of
generality, thatΣm = Σ.
Proposition 6: AssumeΣa ⊆ Σc ⊆ Σm = Σ, then
K1 (= K(L(G))) = CO-OP
↑(L(G), Lϕ,Σa,Σm,Σc) is
regular and effectively computable.
Proof: We first show that OP↑(L(G), Lϕ,Σa) is
controllable with respect toL, Σc. Consider s ∈
OP↑(L(G), Lϕ,Σa) and σ /∈ Σc, such thatsσ ∈ L(G).
As Σa ⊆ Σc, σ /∈ Σa and thensσ ∈ [s]a ∩ L(G) and
according to Lemma 2,sσ ∈ OP↑(L(G), Lϕ,Σa), which is
then controllable w.r.t.L, Σc and observable w.r.t.Σc and
Σm sinceΣm = Σ. Hence,
CO↑(OP↑(L(G), Lϕ,Σa), L(G),Σc,Σm) =
OP↑(L(G), Lϕ,Σa) = K(L(G), Lϕ)
and we conclude using the result of Proposition 3.
3) Assumption 3:Σc ⊆ Σa ⊆ Σm ⊆ Σ: Under this
assumption, even though all actions of the attacker can be
observed by the controller, only a part of them can be
controlled. One can think that the controller can filter out
the requests sent by the attacker to the system, whereas the
outputs of the system cannot be disabled by the controller.
This is for example the behavior of a firewall for Internet
services.
It is easy to check that the system of Example 2, for
which the fix-point computation does not terminate, fulfills
the assumption of this subsection. This leads us to design a
new algorithm.
Using proposition 4, we can assume thatΣm = Σ.
We also make the following assumption without loss of
generality. The system is given by a deterministic LTSG =
(QG,Σ, q
G
0 , δG). The predicateLϕ is specified by a complete
and deterministic LTSSϕ = (QS ,Σ, qS0 , δS) with a setFϕ
of final states such thatLϕ = LFϕ(Sϕ) andL(Sϕ) = Σ
∗.
First, we compute the product ofG and Sϕ in order to
tag the states in which the predicateLϕ is satisfied:Gϕ =
G ‖ Sϕ = (Q,Σ, q0, δ), with Q = QG × QS , q0 = (qG0 , q
S
0 )
andδ the synchronized transition function. By denotingF =
QG × Fϕ, we getLF (Gϕ) = L(G) ∩ Lϕ, meaning that the
execution traces that reach or go through a state ofF reveal
Lϕ (note thatL(Gϕ) = L(G), becauseSϕ is complete).
Thus, Lϕ is opaque w.r.t.L(Gϕ) ⇔ Lϕ is opaque w.r.t.
L(G). Clearly, if Lϕ is non-opaque w.r.t.L(Gϕ) \ Σ∗ΣcΣ∗
and Σa, then no control can enforce the opacity ofLϕ. So
in the sequel, without loss of generality, we assume thatLϕ
is opaque w.r.t.L(Gϕ) \Σ∗ΣcΣ∗ andΣa. In particular, this
entails thatLϕ is opaque w.r.t.L(Gϕ) \ Σ∗c .
Under this assumption, we show that the optimal opacity
control may be enforced by a finite state controller, defined
by a deterministicLTS C = (Q,Σ,Θ0, δ) with the set of
states
Q = {(X, q) : q ∈ X ⊆ Q}
and the initial stateΘ0 = (X0, q0) specified by
X0 = {q ∈ Q : ∃s ∈ (Σ \ Σa)
∗, q0
s
→ q}
Intuitively, after the execution of a traces, the controller
is in a state(X, q) when the controlled system is in state
q (recall thatΣm = Σ) and X is the best estimate of the
current state ofGϕ that the attackerA can get from the
observationPΣa(s) of this execution trace. In particular, if
no event inΣa has been produced yet, the best estimate isX0
(recall that the attacker has full knowledge of the structure
of Gϕ)6.
In the sequel, we denoteT the set of transitions ofGϕ.
The main task, for completing the construction ofC, is to
determine the mapα : 2Q −→ 2T that tells, for each state
(X, q) and simultaneously for allq ∈ X, which setα(X)
of controllable transitions ofGϕ the controller does enable,
thus
α(X) ⊆ α0(X)
∆
= {q
σ
→ q′ ∈ T : q ∈ X, q′ ∈ Q,σ ∈ Σc}.
So, in state(X, q), the controller disables the transitionsq
σ
→
q′ ∈ α0(X) \ α(X), all of which are controllable.
Suppose the correct mapα has been computed. Then the
set TC (of transitions ofC) is inductively defined as the
least set of transitions(X, q)
σ
→C (X
′, q′) such that(X, q)
is reachable,q
σ
→ q′, and the estimateX ′ of the attacker is
updated fromX as follows:
• if σ /∈ Σa, thenX ′ = X
• if σ ∈ (Σa \ Σc), then
X ′ = { q′ : ∃q ∈ X, ∃s ∈ Σ∗, q
s
→ q′ andσ ∼a s} (5)
• if σ ∈ Σc, then
X ′ = {q” : ∃q ∈ X : ∃q′ ∈ Q, ∃s ∈ Σ∗,
q
σ
→ q′ ∈ α(X) andq′
s
→ q” ands ∼a ǫ}
(6)
This is coherent with the idea that the attacker has full
knowledge of the structure ofC, hence ofα.
Lemma 4: Let(X, q)
σs
→C (X
′, q′) with σ ∈ Σa and s ∈
(Σ \Σa)
∗, then∀q′ ∈ X ′, ∃q ∈ X, (X, q)
w
→C (X
′, q′) with
w ∼a σ.
6Some states inQ will possibly be not reachable, but it does not matter
since these states can be eliminated afterwards by trimmingC.
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Lemma 5: LetΘ0
s
→C (X, q) and Θ0
s′
→C (X
′, q′). If
s ∼a s
′ thenX = X ′.
Both lemmas are immediate consequences of the definition
of TC .
We explain now the motivation under the definition of the
mapα. Let (X, q) be a reachable state of the controller, thus
q ∈ X, and let q
σ
→ q′ ∈ T with σ ∈ Σc. If, for some
s ∈ (Σ\Σc)
∗, q′
s
→ q” ∈ F but σs ∼a s′ for no sequences′
such thatq
s′
→ q” /∈ F for someq ∈ X, then the controller
C should disableq
σ
→ q′ when in state(X, q). Hence, one
should haveq
σ
→ q′ /∈ α(X).
X
q′ /∈ F
q” ∈ Fs
q q” ∈ F
w
∼a
w′
q′q
σ
σ
But now suppose that, for somew,w′ ∈ (Σ \ Σc)∗ and
q ∈ X, q′, q” ∈ Q, q
σw
→ q” ∈ F , w ∼
a
w′, and
q′
w′
→ q′ /∈ F (thus ¬(s ∼
a
w′)). If q
σ
→ q′ /∈ α(X), and
the attacker has full knowledge ofC and the mapα, the
transition sequenceq
σw
→ q” may now reveal the predicate
Lϕ, since the attacker knows that the masking transition
sequenceq
σw′
→ q′ is disabled byC. Therefore,α(X) must
be computed iteratively as the limit of a decreasing chain
started from the finite setα0(X).
The definition ofα(X) is as follows. LetT range over
the subsets ofα0(X), and forσ ∈ Σc, let
Next(X,σ, T )
∆
= {q′ ∈ Q : ∃q ∈ X, q
σ
→ q′ ∈ T}
then
α(X)
∆
= gfp(λT.α0(X) ∩ Accept(X,T )), (7)
whereAccept(X,T ) = T \ Bad(X,T ) letting
Bad(X,T )
∆
= {t ∈ T : t = q
σ
→ q′, q ∈ X, σ ∈ Σc,
PΣa(L{q′},F (G) ∩ (Σ \ Σc)
∗)\
PΣa(LNext(X,σ,T ),(Q\F )(G)) 6= ∅}
All transitions inBad(X,T ) should be disabled by con-
trol, because they may lead to a confidential information
flow by triggering one controllable event followed by an
uncontrollable sequence of events.
Remark 2: The controllerC is computed by independent
iterations of the operatorAccept(X,T ) for all X ⊆ Q and
T ⊆ α0(X). ⋄
We will now prove thatLϕ is opaque w.r.t.L(C), that
L(C) is controllable and observable, and that it is the supre-
mal sub-language ofL(G) = L(Gϕ) with these properties.
Proposition 7: Lϕ is opaque w.r.t.L(C) and Σa
Proof: Considers ∈ L(C) ∩ Lϕ ⊆ L(G).
• If PΣc(s) = ε, then s /∈ Σ
∗ΣcΣ
∗. As by hypothesis
Lϕ is opaque w.r.t.L(Gϕ) \ (Σ∗ΣcΣ∗) and Σa, there
exists s′ ∈ L(Gϕ) such thats′ ∼a s and s′ 6∈ Lϕ.
SinceΣc ⊆ Σa, we also havePΣc(s
′) = ε and hence
s′ ∈ L(C).
• if PΣc(s) 6= ε, thens can be decomposed ass = s1cs2
with c ∈ Σc ands2 ∈ (Σ\Σc)∗. There exists(X, q) ∈ Q
and q1 ∈ Q such thatΘ0
s1→ (X, q) and (q
c
→ q1) ∈
α(X). Let (X, q)
c
→C (X
′, q1), thus
X ′ = {q” ∈ Q : ∃q′ ∈ Next(X, c, α(X)),
∃s ∈ Σ∗, q′
s
→ q” ands ∼a ǫ}
Assume for a contradiction that∀q′1 ∈ X
′,
∀s′2 ∈ [s2]a, (X
′, q′1)
s′
2→C (Z, q
′
2) entails q
′
2 ∈
F . Then s′2 ∈ L{q′
1
},F (Gϕ) ∩ (Σ \ Σc)
∗ and
PΣa(s2) /∈ PΣa(LX′,(Q\F )(Gϕ)), hence(q
c
→ q1) ∈
Bad(X,α(X)), in contradiction with (X, q)
c
→C
(X ′, q1). Therefore,(X ′, q′1)
s′
2→C (Z, q
′
2) for someq
′
1 ∈
X ′, s′2 ∈ [s2]a, andq
′
2 /∈ F . Now, (X, q)
c
→C (X
′, q1)
and q′1 ∈ X
′ entail that(X, q)
cs′
→C (X
′, q′1) for some
q ∈ X ands′ ∈ (Σ\Σa)∗ (Lemma 4), andq ∈ X entails
that Θ0
s′
1→C (X, q) for somes′1 ∼a s1 (Lemma 4).
Altogether,s = s1cs2 ∼a s′1cs
′s′2 ∈ L(C) \Lϕ. SoLϕ
is opaque w.r.t.L(C) andΣa.
Proposition 8: L(C) is controllable w.r.t.L(Gϕ) andΣc.
Proof: Let s ∈ L(C) and σ ∈ Σ \ Σc such thatsσ ∈
L(Gϕ). Then,∃(X, q) ∈ Q such thatΘ0
s
→ (X, q) in C and
∃q′ ∈ Q such thatq
σ
→ q′ in Gϕ. Sinceσ 6∈ Σc, (X, q)
c
→C
(X ′q′) for someq′ by definition ofTC , hencesσ ∈ L(C).
Theorem 1: Assume thatΣc ⊆ Σa ⊆ Σm = Σ, then
L(C) = CO-OP↑(L(G), Lϕ,Σa,Σ,Σc)
Proof: Let K = CO-OP↑(L(G), Lϕ,Σa,Σ,Σc). SinceLϕ
is opaque w.r.t.L(C) and Σa, L(C) is controllable w.r.t.
L(Gϕ) andΣc, andL(C) is observable w.r.t.Σm andL(G)
(asΣm = Σ), we haveL(C) ⊆ K.
It remains to prove thatK ⊆ L(C). We proceed by
contradiction. Lets ∈ K \ L(C). This sequence can be
decomposed as = s1σs2, wheres1 is the longest prefix
of s such that[s1]a ∩ K = [s1]a ∩ L(C), hences1 ∈ L(C)
(sinces1 ∈ K), [s1σ]a ∩ K 6= [s1σ]a ∩ L(C) (by definition
of s1), andσ ∈ Σa (because[s1σ]a 6= [s1]a).
SinceL(C) ⊆ K, [s1σ]a∩L(C) ⊂ [s1σ]a∩K and one can
find u = u1σu2 in [s1σ]a ∩K, with u1 ∼a s1 andu2 ∼a ǫ,
such thatu1σu2 /∈ L(C). As s1 ∈ L(C) ∩ K, u1 ∼a s1
andu1 ∈ K, necessarilyu1 ∈ L(C) by definition ofs1. As
u1 ∈ L(C), u2 ∈ (Σ \ Σc)∗, u1σu2 ∈ L(Gϕ) \ L(C), and
L(C) is controllable, necessarilyu1σ /∈ L(C) andσ ∈ Σc.
Sinceu1 ∈ L(C), there exists(X, q) ∈ Q such thatΘ0
u1→
(X, q). By construction ofC, q0
u1→ q in Gϕ, q ∈ X, and
X = {q1 ∈ Q : ∃u ∈ [u1]a ∩ L(C), q0
u
→ q1}. It also
follows from the construction ofC that
α(X) = {q1
c
→ q2 : q1 ∈ X, q2 ∈ Q, c ∈ Σc s.t.
∃u ∈ [u1]a ∩ L(C), q0
u
→ q1 anduc ∈ L(C)}
and moreover, for allq1
c
→ q2 ∈ α(X), ∀u ∈ [u1]a ∩ L(C),
q0
u
→ q1 ⇒ uc ∈ L(C). Therefore,u1 ∈ [u1]a∩L(C), q0
u1→
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q, σ ∈ Σc, and u1σ /∈ L(C) entail thatα(X) contains no
transitionq
σ
→ q′.
Consider now the alternative set of transitions
β = {q1
c
→ q2 : q1 ∈ X, q2 ∈ Q,σ ∈ Σc
s.t. ∃u ∈ [u1]a ∩ K, q0
u
→ q1 anduσ ∈ K}
Then clearlyα(X) ⊆ β (becauseL(C) ⊆ K) andβ contains
a transitionq
σ
→ q′ (becauseq0
u1→ q, u1σ ∈ K, andK ⊆
L(Gϕ)). Therefore,α(X) ⊂ β.
In order to complete the proof, we will show that(q1
c
→
q2) /∈ Bad(X,β) for all c ∈ Σc and(q1
c
→ q2) ∈ β, entailing
that Accept(X,β) = β \ Bad(X,β) = β, and hence that
β ⊆ α(X) in view of the greatest fixpoint definition ofα(X),
resulting in a contradiction withα(X) ⊂ β.
Let (q1
c
→ q2) ∈ Bad(X,β). Recalling thatBad(X,β) ⊆
β and that[u1]a = [s1]a, let u ∈ [u1]a ∩ L(C) = [u1]a ∩ K
such thatΘ0
u
→C (X, q1) and uc ∈ K. As (q1
c
→ q2) ∈
Bad(X,β), there must existv ∈ (Σ \ Σc)∗ such thatucv ∈
Lϕ∩L(Gϕ). K is controllable, henceucv ∈ K. Lϕ is opaque
w.r.t. K and Σa, then ∃w ∈ [ucv]a ∩ K such thatw 6∈
Lϕ. As w ∈ [ucv]a and c ∈ Σc ⊆ Σa, there should exist
w1, w2 ∈ Σ
∗ such thatw = w1cw2 with w1 ∼a u ∼a u1
andw2 ∼a v. Now, w1 ∈ [u1]a∩K ⇒ w1 ∈ [u1]a∩L(C) ⇒
∃q3 ∈ X, Θ0
w1→ (X, q3) in C, by Lemma 5. Asw1c ∈ K,
there must existq4 ∈ Q such that(q3
c
→ q4) ∈ β and thus
q4 ∈ Next(X, c, β). Now, v ∈ L{q2},F (G) ∩ (Σ \ Σc)
∗,
w2 ∈ L{q4},(Q\F )(G)∩(Σ\Σc)
∗, andv ∼a w2, so based on
the definition of theBad operator,(q1
c
→ q2) 6∈ Bad(X,β),
which is the expected contradiction.
Example 3: To illustrate the algorithm, let us come back
to our previous example, whereF = {3, 11}.
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Fig. 6. L(G) andLϕ
At the first step of the computation ofL(C), we getX0 =
{0}, Θ0 = (X0, 0)) andα0(X0) = {(0
c
→ 1)}. Now, we also
havePΣa(L(Gϕ, 1, F )∩(Σ\Σc)
∗) = ∅, implying(0
c
→ 1) /∈
Bad(X0, α0(X0)), and thusα(X0) = {(0
c
→ 1)}. Thus, in
C, we haveΘ0
c
→C ({1, 6}, 1).
Further, for X1 = {1, 6}, we getα0(X1) = {(1
c
→ 2), (6
c
→
7)}, Next(X1, c, α0(X1)) = {2, 7},
PΣa(L(Gϕ, 2, F ) ∩ (Σ \ Σc)
∗) = {A}
and PΣa(L(Gϕ, Next(X1, c, α0(X1)), Q \ F )
= (cc)+.(A + cB) + cB + cc
({0}, 0)
u
c
({1, 6}, 6)
c
({1, 6}, 1)
({0, 7}, 7)({0, 7}, 0)
u
c
Fig. 7. The corresponding supervisorC
Thus, 1
c
→ 2 ∈ Bad(X1, α0(X1)) and (1
c
→ 2) /∈
α1(X1). Finally, it can be shown that{(6
c
→ 7)} = α(X1).
The other values ofα(X) for X ∈ Q can be computed
similarly. The resultingC is given by the LTS of Figure 7⋄
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VI. CONCLUSION
Given a finite transition systemG over Σ and a regular
predicateLϕ ⊆ Σ∗, we have addressed the problem of
computing a supervisorC that enforces the opacity ofLϕ
against an attacker with alphabetΣa ⊆ Σ, supposedly trying
to pushG × C to revealLϕ (i.e. to produce an execution
s such thatPΣa(s) = PΣa(s
′) ⇒ s′ ∈ Lϕ for all s′ ∈
L(G×C)). We have shown how computing the optimal finite
state supervisorC with controllable (observable) alphabetΣc
(Σm) in all cases whereΣc ⊆ Σm and Σa compares with
both.
We do not know yet whether the technical answer we
have provided to this problem can be extended to cope with
more complex situations, such as for instance the case where
Σc ⊆ Σm and Σa ⊆ Σm (the algorithm defined in V-
B.3 may not give the optimal supervisor in this case), or
the case where one wants to enforce simultaneously the
opacity of two predicates with respect to two attackers with
different interfaces. An important question to be studied
before applications are considered is the relation between
opacity and finite state abstraction of possibly infinite state
systems. Another topic of interest is the preservation of
opacity by algebraic operations of system composition.
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